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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

THE PATENTABILITY O A MENTAL Paoc~ss.-The" fact of possession has
been so correlated with the theory of property that it is difficult to -dissociate
onvfiership from the possibility of physical possession. One finds that the
average lawyer, even th6ugh-he may defind a right in rem as a right enforcibl6 against any person, is extremely apt, unless after especial thought,
to ixplain that it is enfbfcible against anyone because it pertains to a thing
capable of physical possession and control, a thing that could be actually
sequestered, from all other persons. Not at all infrequently the term property has been judicially stripped even of its significance of a right, and con-
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fined to the objective material thing to which the right might apply. As a
matter of fact, comparatively few things have ever been legally recognized
as the object of property 'which have not been tangible. The right to one's
reputation, and, more lately recognized, the right to privacy, for instance,
are rights it rem, although incapable of tangible possession. The right to
have a contract performed without interference by a third party and, it has
been said, the right created by assignment of a chose in action, are equally
rights in rem. These, and other res, are mere concepts, in no sense whatever
corporeal, although the rights concerning them so appertain to the particular person in whose favor they exist as to be truly property rights, and
correctly said to be owned by him. But the whole number of these is small
compared to the quantity of tangible things which are the subject of property,
and even these rights are not usually spoken of, even judicially, in terms of
property, as are those pertaining to tangible things.
This difficulty in recognizing a mere mental concept, incapable of physical
custody, as a proper subject of legal ownership, is quite evident in the law
no proprelating to patents for inventions. The Common Law recognized
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his idea of means to the particular end locked in his own mind, it could
not be legally dragged from him. Even if he revealed it, in such a way
that the recipient of the knowledge was pledged to secrecy, equity would
enjoin a breach of that pledge by the holder of the secret. But if the
idea became known, in any way, its enjoyment was free to the public. The
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Any right in. rem to the sole enjoyment of the idea depended altogether
in
upon an express grant thereof by the sovereign, and still depends,
this country, wholly upon a grant of such right from the government. The
statutes permitting such grants, and the patents granted thereunder, have
been interpreted and construed by courts trained in the Common Law and accustomed to its assumptions. It is not suprising, therefore, to find occasionally evinced the feeling that the subject matter of a patent, that is, an "invention," ought to be something more than a mere concept bf means,
indeed must be a tangible thing of some sort. The very statute conveys this
impression in directing the issue of a patent for an "art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter."
Vortunately for the undoubted purpose of the patent statutes, this has
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been confined to expression and not carried into actual decision. It has not
been wholly innocuous, because of the confusion it appears to have caused
between "invention" and "evidence of the existence of" a particular invention. But so far as actual decisions are concerned, and in all careful expression, it is unquestionably the concept of the means to the end which is
the subject of the patented property, and not merely the particular tangible
things -which may be constructed in embodiment of the idea. Indeed, things
which are so constructed by others than the patentee, however wrongfully
it may be done, are not the property of the patentee and do not become so
because of their infringing character.
Unless a patent is extremely narrow, the patentee's protection is not restricted to the particular machine or device he may describe. His monopoly
includes all machines of the same type and purpose which, though different
in substantial form, do not involve any inventive difference. These can not
be called the "same" machine as the one described by the patent since they
are obviously materially different, but, as they embody the same idea of
means, they are called "equivalents." If it were the tangible machine which
was patented, this breadth of protection could not follow. It can be predicated only on the fact that the invention protected is the idea of means
embodied in the material means literally described.
A good illustration of the fact -that it is the idea which is patented, and
not the substantial embodiment, is the case of Tilghman v. Proctor,1o2 U. "S.
'707. The patentee in this case claimed nothing substantial at all, but said
merely, "I claim, as my invention, the manufacturing of fat acids and
glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature and
pressure." In his description he did set out a particular tangible means by
which this could be accomplished. The court held that his protection was
not limited to the described means but covered the accomplishing of the result by obviously different material aids. It named the invention a "process"
or a "mode of acting," and distinguished it from a "machine" by -saying
"The one [machine] is visible to the eye-an object of perpetual observation. The other is a conception of the mind, seen only by its effects when
being executed or performed."
Practically all of the definitions likewise concede that "The invention itself
is an intellectual process or operation," Phila. Etc. R. R. Co. v. Stimpson, 14
Pet. 448, or in other more or less precise expression indicate that it is the
mental concept, and not the tangible embodiment of it which really constitutes the subject of the patent. (The quoted definition is, of course, inexact to the extent that it attempts to express a "thing" in terms of an "act,"
but the thought contained in it is clearly that an invention is a concept.) It
'would be supererogatory to demonstrate further this fact.
An idea of means which is not capable of embodiment as an objective
means has never, so far as the writer is aware, been the subject of an
adjudicated patent. It is therefore an undecided question whether an invention which does not require tangible instrumentalities to effectuate the
result desired is patentable. To argue that it is patentable would Seem, it

HeinOnline -- 15 Mich. L. Rev. 662 1916-1917

1VOTE AND COMMENT
must be confessed, like opposing a merely conjured contradiction, were it
not for the number of patent law experts who have expressed a belief that
such an idea could not be subject of a patent.
It is difficult, though not impossible, to conceive of an idea of means
which does not involve the use of tangible instrumentalities. It largely
depends on what one admits to be the "instrumentalities." There has been
published, apparently at the author's expense, an amusing pamphlet, unconsciously amusing, and rather pathetically so, called "The Bitter, Bitter
Cry of Outcast Inventors." The author's plaint is the refusal of the British
government to patent an invention of his, and the suggestion of various
publishers, to whom he offered the exposition of his idea, that he rest
and recuperate in the country. His concept was a system of shorthand. To
utilize it, fifteen men sit in a row, with fifteen more behind them. When
a speech to be reported is commenced, person number one in the rear row
taps the shoulder of number one in the front row just as the first word of
the speech is being uttered. At the utterance of the second word, person
number two of the rear ranks taps the shoulder of person number two in the
front rank. Thus each rear rank man taps the shoulder of the man in front
o him, in rotation, as the consecutive words of the speech are delivered. The
person so tapped writes the word being uttered as the signal is given. At the
end of the speech, a compilation of all the written words becomes a verbatim
report of the speech. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that this concept involved inventive genius, would it be -patentable?
Even if it were admitted to be patentable, it might be said actually to
utilize substantive means, namely, the persons of the thirty men, to effectuate
its end, and therefore not to be conclusive of the issue. If one were to
evolve a method for trisecting the angle, it is possible that the pencil and
paper required-if only to present an unknown angle-might be called a
substantive "means." Arithmeticians and mathematicians, however, are frequently evolving short-cuts to a desired end which involve purely mental
processes, and -which overwhelm the non-mathematical mind with astonished
admiration at the rapidity with which the giver% result is reached. If one of
these methods of arriving at the desired result were the creation of inventive
genius-and surely the productions of mathematicians are more truly the result df something transcending mere trained skill, common to all their
calling, than are many mechanical inventions-would it be patentable?
The only possible objection is , lingering vestige of the common feeling
that property is physical. But when the Patent Law has been pressed to
the point, it has invariably acted en the assumption that patented property
is intangible. It is true that intangible property can not be "made," and it
is loosely said-again the supposition of physical property-that it is not
vendible, yet the patent statute gives an exclusive right to make, use and vend
the invention. If making, using and vending were all necessary to constitute
infringement, it is obvious that a mere mental process could not be infringed,
and therefore was not presumably intended as the subject matter of a
patent. But the phrase has been consistently interpreted as meaning make,
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use or vend. It is in nowise necessary that an infringer do all of the forbidden acts, the doing of any one of them is sufficient, and it does not follow that patentable invention must be capable of enjoyment or infringement
in all three ways. Its susceptibility to "use" would surely be sufficient.
There is nothing therefore in the wording of the statute to preclude the
patenting of such a process for accomplishing a desired result.
No more is there any reason in law, as established extraneous to the patent
decisions, why the inventor should not have an exclusive right to the use
of such an invention, except the bald fact that the Common Law did not
recognize a right in rem to any invention. It did recognize other intangible
res, however, so that there was no legal impossibility in an intangible ambit
for a property right. As respects inventions particularly, the Common Law
was changed by the statute. The logic of the change undoubtedly extends
it to all inventions, whether they utilize tangible instrumentalities or not.
It is true that the exclusive right to such an invention might be extremely
difficult to enforce, but *the mere practical unsatisfactoriness of the remedy
has never derogated the completeness of the right. Furthermore, it is not
inconceivable that the exclusive right to use such an invention might have
a very practicable value. If the means, the mental process, were one which
could be used on the stage, for instance, to mystify ahdiences of those who
were unacquainted with its details, the right to its use for such purposes
might well be of considerable monetary value. "Whether it is the law
that such a concept is patentable, only the Supreme Court can say. Till that
tribunal has spoken, it is, like the presence or absence of the inventive quality, a matter of opinion. But it may be said of this, as a certain lecturer
used to say of invention, "if there is no reason why it is not, it probably is."
_

.W.
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